In search of a better governance in the euro area by Mathieu, Catherine & Sterdyniak, Henri
Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
IN SEARCH OF A BETTER GOVERNANCE 
IN THE EURO AREA
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
OFCE-Sciences Po
The 2007 crisis highlighted the drawbacks of the euro area framework which 
were already there from the launch of the single currency. There cannot be a 
single currency between countries with different economic situations and inde-
pendent economic policies. Euro area governance (no public debts guarantee by 
the ECB, arbitrary rules focusing on public finances only), was not satisfactory. 
EU institutions tried to impose a strategy (domestic policies constraints, public 
deficits cuts, liberal structural reforms) which failed. Before the crisis, imbal-
ances had risen between Northern Member States (MS) and Southern MS, and 
became unsustainable with the crisis. 
The Fiscal pact strengthened rules lacking economic rationale. Blind 
austerity policies led the euro area to fall in depression and undermined euro 
area cohesion. The procedures implemented strengthen economic policy 
surveillance between MS, without organising real domestic economic policy 
coordination. They allow for limited solidarity, at a very high price. Fiscal feder-
alism projects cannot offset the loss of independence for domestic economic 
policies. 
MS Public debts should become safe assets again, thanks to the ECB’s guar-
antee. This requires implementing real economic coordination, which should 
target growth, full-employment and orderly reduction in imbalances between 
MS. Europe should reaffirm its specificity: a social model, a will to prepare for 
ecological transition. These are prerequisites for Europe to make progress. 
1. A framework with original drawbacks
The rise in imbalances between MS from 1999 to 2007, and the 
2007 crisis highlighted the drawbacks of the euro area framework. 
EU institutions and MS have been unable to implement a common 
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economic strategy, and not even a satisfactory economic policy co-
ordination. The single currency suffers from six original sins:
— According to economic theory, there cannot be a single 
currency between countries with different economic situations 
and independent economic policies. The single currency entails 
introducing precise, well-defined and binding constraints, soli-
darity mechanisms or economic policy coordination. How to 
prevent otherwise the emergence and persistence of imbalances 
between some countries running large external deficits and some 
others running large surpluses? 
— These mechanisms cannot consist in rigid numerical rules, 
lacking economic rationale, and enshrined in a Treaty. These 
mechanisms should be both soft (economic policies should be 
agreed between countries accounting for current domestic 
economic contexts) and binding (everyone must comply with 
decisions agreed in common). But how may governments with 
necessarily different interests and analyses agree on economic 
policy strategies? How to convince a country to modify its 
economic policy in order to meet common rules?
— There cannot be unconditional solidarity between countries 
with different and autonomous policies. For example, Northern 
countries may refuse to support Southern countries, blaming them 
for not having undertaken the necessary structural reforms, for 
having let imbalances grow and for being unable to meet their 
commitments. On the other hand, such solidarity is a prerequisite 
for the single currency to be guaranteed. 
— According to the EU Constitution, the ECB is not entitled to 
finance directly governments (Article 123); financial solidarity 
between MS is forbidden (Article 125). Thus, each MS must borrow 
on financial markets without any guaranteed support from a 
central bank acting as a “lender of last resort”. This raises the risk 
that some MS may not be able to fulfil their commitments and 
may default. MS public debt is no longer a safe asset. Contrary to 
the US, the UK or Japan, euro area countries have lost monetary 
sovereignty. Financial markets started to realise this from mid-
2009. After the Greek default, they requested excessive interest 
rates to countries in difficulty, which increased further the difficul-
ties of the latter.
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— Euro area MS are now under financial markets’ surveillance 
and they do not control anymore their interest rates unlike Anglo-
Saxon countries or Japan. But financial markets have no macroeco-
nomic expertise, they are – and know that they are – self-fulfilling. 
However, Northern countries refuse a collective guarantee of MS 
public debts. They consider the discipline imposed by financial 
markets to be necessary. But disparity among interest rates is arbi-
trary and costly. In the long term, for instance, a country like Italy, 
with a 2 percentage points interest rates spread with France, would 
pay financial markets a premium of around 2.5% of GDP as a guar-
antee to an alleged default risk. The single currency notion 
disappears: a Spanish company does not borrow at the same 
interest rate as a German company.
— The Commission, the high EU and domestic administrations 
are currently dominated by a federal, liberal and technocratic 
ideology. According to this ideology, Europe should deprive demo-
cratic countries (subject to demagogic temptations) from their 
powers to move towards a liberal model: tax cuts, social and public 
spending cuts, structural reforms, market deregulation. 
Before the crisis, imbalances rose between two groups of euro 
area countries implementing two instable macroeconomic strate-
gies: Northern countries (Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Finland) 
were basing weak growth on competitiveness gains and huge 
external surpluses while strong growth in southern countries 
(Spain, Greece, Ireland) was driven by negative real interest rates 
below GDP growth, and was accompanied by housing bubbles and 
large current account deficits (see Deroose et al., 2004, Mathieu 
and Sterdyniak, 2007). In 2007, the Netherlands and Germany ran 
current accounts surpluses larger than 8% of GDP, Portugal, Spain 
and Greece were running current account deficits larger than 8% of 
GDP. The economic policy framework introduced by the Maas-
tricht Treaty, based on the single control of public deficits was 
unable to prevent the widening of these imbalances which became 
unsustainable under the effect of the crisis. The Commission 
pursued in vain countries in depression and not fulfilling the 3% 
of GDP limit for the government deficit (especially France and 
Germany in 2003-2006) without seeing that the danger was 
coming from countries with rapid growth, which were bringing 
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their public finances in balance at the price of high increases in 
private or external indebtedness. 
The 2007-2009 crisis was a banking and financial crisis, caused 
by hazardous innovations, in a context of uncontrolled financial 
globalisation and liberalisation, of rising amounts of capital 
looking for liquid and high returns. Financial markets were greedy, 
blind, and instable. Financial globalisation allowed for a rise in 
imbalances which finally burst (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2009).
The crisis is not due to the rise in government debts and defi-
cits. In 2007, the euro area deficit was amounting 0.6% of GDP 
only. However the crisis generated an unprecedented deterioration 
of public finances, due to the need to rescue banks, to stabilise 
output, and even more because of lower tax revenues resulting 
from lower output. Public finance deterioration was smaller for the 
euro area as a whole, where the deficit reached 6.2% of GDP in 
2010, against 8.3% in Japan, 10% in the UK and 12.2% in the US. 
From 2007 to 2013 the debt-to-GDP ratio rose by 27 percentage 
points in the euro area, by 40 percentage points in the US, 51 in 
the UK, and 60 in Japan.
The euro area was unable to implement a coherent strategy to 
recover the 10 percentage points of output lost because of the crisis. 
Even worse, financial markets bet on the failure and euro area exit 
of several MS. Three countries were placed under the Troika’s 
supervision (Greece, Portugal, Ireland). Two other countries (Spain, 
Italy) suffered from excessively high interest rates. The financial 
crisis developed into a sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. 
The EU authorities and the MS did not respond sufficiently 
rapidly and strongly. They denied to guarantee public debts; they 
implemented limited solidarity only, and under strict condition-
ality. Under the Commission’s pressure, financial markets’ and 
rating agencies’ fears, MS had no choice but implement restrictive 
policies, which in times of austerity undermines their output 
growth and their social model.
At the euro area level, fiscal consolidation measures amounted 
to 1.7% of GDP in 2011, 2.0% in 2012 and 1.1% in 2013. Under the 
Troika’s pressure, Southern MS implemented even more drastic 
fiscal plans. This strategy brought the nascent recovery to an end 
(at the end of 2010, euro area GDP was 2.2% higher than at the end 
In search of a better governance in the euro area 131
of 2009). Euro area output declined the two following years. These 
fiscal contraction policies had a negative impact of around 8.0% of 
GDP for the euro area, but 16% for Spain and Portugal, 30% for 
Greece. Public debts-to-GDP ratios hardly declined due to the 
output fall.
In 2011-2013, global demand remained too weak in the euro 
area. Northern countries, with rooms for manoeuvre should have 
implemented expansionary policies to offset restrictive policies 
run in Southern countries. European investment programmes to 
help the industry to reorient current activities and develop innova-
tive and green sectors should have been launched. Fiscal policy 
should not have been restrictive at the euro area level as long as the 
euro area economy was not moving sufficiently rapidly towards 
full-employment.
Can fiscal exit strategies ignore the causes of the crisis? The 
crisis is due to growth strategies based on downwards pressure on 
wages and social benefits. The fall in demand was offset by compet-
itiveness gains in neo-mercantilist countries, by rising financial 
and real estate bubbles and households borrowing in Anglo-Saxon 
and Southern Europe countries. The failure of these two strategies 
has forced to use public deficits to support growth. Reducing 
public deficits requires the implementation of another growth 
strategy based on wages and social incomes distribution, on a new 
industrial policy geared towards an environmentally sustainable 
economy. Before the crisis, public finances also suffered from tax 
evasion and tax competition. Restoring public finances requires to 
combat tax evasion and tax havens, to raise taxes on multinational 
companies, on higher incomes and wealth.
2. Some federalism? 
2.1. The fiscal Treaty
Even though the rise in deficits is a consequence and not the 
cause of the crisis, the Commission persists in saying that the crisis 
is due to fiscal indiscipline. The fiscal Treaty adopted on 2 March 
2012 is supposed to eradicate this.  
This Pact requests MS to bring their structural government 
deficit below 0.5% of GDP, according a time frame proposed by the 
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Commission. But this figure has no economic rationale. Estimating 
structural balances is more than problematic, especially in the event 
of strong macroeconomic shocks. The Commission’s estimates will 
have to be used, but these estimates are always revised, are always 
close to observed output, since the Commission considers that falls 
in productivity growth and capital stock in recessions are structural: 
thus, the under-estimation of the cyclical part of the deficit will 
require to implement counter-cyclical policies. 
The structural deficit target can be lowered to 1% if debt stands 
below 60% of GDP. A country with GDP growing by 1.75% per year 
and inflation rising by 1.75% per year sees in theory its debt coming 
down to 28.6% of GDP. But nothing guarantees that the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium may be ensured with a priori set values. 
According to article 5, a country under an EDP will have to 
submit its budget and its structural reform programmes for 
approval to the Commission and the Council who will also exert 
surveillance on their implementation. This article is a new weapon 
to impose liberal reforms to MS populations. According to article 7, 
the Commission’s proposals will be automatically adopted unless 
there is a qualified majority against them, the country concerned 
not voting. Thus, in practice, the Commission will always have the 
last word. 
The Pact forbids discretionary fiscal policies, although the latter 
are needed to reach a satisfactory macroeconomic stabilisation. 
According to the Treaty, each country should take fiscal consolida-
tion measures without accounting for the cyclical conditions and 
policies in other countries. Despite the 2008-2013 experience, the 
Treaty maintains the implicit assumption according to which 
restrictive fiscal policies have no impact on output. No real 
economic policy coordination is considered, i.e. an economic 
strategy using monetary policy, fiscal, taxation, social and wage 
policies, to bring MS closer to full employment and to reduce 
imbalances between MS.    
2.2. Improving economic policy coordination
In 2011 a first ‘European semester’ was introduced, during 
which MS present their fiscal plans and structural programmes to 
the Commission and the European Council, who both give their 
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opinion before the vote in their national parliament in the second 
semester of the year. Such a process could be useful if the objective 
was to define an agreed economic strategy, but, in fact, this 
semester increases the pressure on each MS to implement austerity 
measures and liberal reforms. No agreed plans to reduce imbal-
ances between MS or to support growth have been implemented in 
2012, 2013 or 2014.
The Six-Pack allow the Commission to exert surveillance on the 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances in each country by 
following a scoreboard of relevant variables (competitiveness, 
external current account, public and private debts). A Macroeco-
nomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) has been introduced. So far the 
Commission does not recommend coordinated strategies to 
support growth or to reduce imbalances, but only signals each 
country what their problems are. 
2.3.  Some very conditional financial solidarity
The European Stability mechanism (ESM) launched in October 
2012 introduces some degree of financial solidarity between the 
MS, but this solidarity is limited and has a very high price. Coun-
tries may benefit from the ESM if they have adopted the Fiscal pact 
and have fulfilled it. The ESM support will be conditional: a country 
needs to commit to fulfil a drastic fiscal adjustment programme 
imposed by the Troika, and will therefore lose all domestic fiscal 
autonomy and have to accept a long austerity period. The Greek 
example shows that this type of plan is not the way out of the crisis. 
The solidarity which is being implemented does not consist in 
donations but in loans. The ESM debt will be considered prior to 
private ones. Public bond issuance should involve a collective 
action clause, i.e. in case of default, stated by the Commission and 
the IMF, the country will be entitled to agree with creditors on a 
change in payment conditions, the agreement applying to all credi-
tors if a majority agrees. Euro area government debts will become 
speculative as was the case for developing economies; the interest 
rate on public bonds will rise, be more volatile and less easy to 
control. Why build the euro area to reach such a situation? 
On 6 September 2012, the ECB announced a purchasing bonds 
programme on the secondary markets, for short-term bonds (1-
3 years), the so-called OMT (outright monetary transactions). In 
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putting no ceiling to its interventions, the ECB reassured markets 
on default risks in the concerned countries, on the risks of a euro 
area break-up. The ECB broke the spiral of self-fulfilling expecta-
tions and finally did not have to intervene. Lower interest rates can 
help to boost activity. Conversely, the ECB imposes its views on 
the economic strategy to be implemented, requests product and 
labour markets structural reforms, the full commitment to govern-
ment balance targets despite the recession. Although the OMT was 
not used in practice, the simple fact that it exists was sufficient to 
reduce substantially interest rates spreads. In February 2014, the 
Karlsruhe Constitutional Court refereed the case of the OMT before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, judging that it was not 
conform to the German constitution, which could oblige Germany 
to finance spending not being voted by the German Parliament. 
The euro area remains under the threat of financial markets defi-
ance, following elections results or the appearance of economic, 
fiscal or banking imbalances. This is a house of cards rather than a 
solid edifice.  
2.4. Towards a deep and genuine economic and monetary union? 
In November 2012, the Commission suggested major steps 
towards federalism (European Commission, 2012):
— ‘All major economic and fiscal policy choices by a MS should 
be subject to deeper coordination, endorsement and surveil-
lance process at the EU level’. The possibility of different 
economic or social strategies is forgotten or prohibited.
— The needs for strengthened fiscal discipline and for ex ante
fiscal coordination are asserted. But, after the fiscal pact, 
what remains to be coordinated since all fiscal policies have 
to be run in autopilot mode?
— The EMU could be entitled to use a “convergence and 
competitiveness instrument”, within the balanced budget 
framework. A country could sign an agreement with the 
Commission, according to which it would implement struc-
tural reforms and would therefore get a financial reward 
from other MS. Can we imagine that a country would get 
subsidies in order to abolish its minimum wage, or its public 
pensions system? 
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— A common European Redemption Fund (ERF) could be intro-
duced to amortise public debts, with strict conditionality, 
based on the German proposal (see Doluca et al., 2012): each 
country would have to commit to reimburse each year a 
share of the public debt above 60% of GDP, so as to bring 
public debt below 60% of GDP in 25 years. In counterpart of 
this commitment, the share of the debt above 60% of GDP 
would be commonly guaranteed. But this project requires to 
implement even more fiscal contraction, and does not 
consider the impacts on output, debt, and deficits. It 
assumes that fiscal policy may be run in an automatic mode, 
and be entirely devoted to the debt reducing objective. 
— The proposal to issue euro-bonds guaranteed by all MS or by 
the ECB has not been considered. Germany refuses to make 
unlimited and unconditional commitments to support other 
MS. But how to strengthen the euro area without such 
commitments?
Three questions remain: 
1. Should EU institutions’ powers be strengthened, as long as 
there is no guarantee that EU institutions could work more 
democratically, as long as the EU does not implement a 
growth strategy, as long as it remains focused on absurd 
public finance criteria, liberal structural reforms, and public 
expenditure cuts? 
2. Can we imagine all major economic and social decisions 
being made at the EU level, by the Commission or the 
Council without accounting for national votes and debates? 
3. Can we image a federal power able to account for domestic 
specificities in a Europe made of heterogeneous countries? 
Can we imagine a single policy implemented in different 
countries? Or different policies implemented through a 
central process? 
Some consider that the euro area could introduce short-term 
stabilisation mechanisms managed by the European Commission 
(European Commission, 2013), but this is an illusion with the 
Commission underestimating output gaps and forbidding discre-
tionary policies. Some suggest the unification of unemployment 
insurance systems, but national systems are often managed by 
social partners and are currently very diverse. The unification of 
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the systems would be likely to be made towards the bottom. A 
country having made efforts to reduce its unemployment rate will 
refuse to pay for high unemployment rates countries, and will 
blame the latter for not having undertaken the necessary reforms. 
Some (like Enderlein et al., 2013) propose to base transfers between 
MS on output gap differentials, but they forget that output gaps are 
a vague concept, with a questionable and variable over time meas-
urement. MS do not need fiscal federalism, but they need to 
recover the ability to run stabilisation fiscal policies. 
Requesting that each country reaches a macroeconomic equilib-
rium with budgetary positions in balance implies that private 
sector savings have a counterpart in an external surplus (the 
German model). This requires that the rest of the world agrees to 
absorb European surpluses, and also that Southern MS increase 
their competitiveness. This implies a long stagnation period 
followed by an investment rebound. This scenario is unlikely if 
wage cuts depress output so much that profits do not improve, and 
investment remains depressed due to weak domestic demand. 
Austerity policies are more likely to depress permanently economic 
and social dynamism in those countries.
3. A new economic policy framework? 
The euro area needs to choose between two frameworks: relying 
on markets to implement fiscal discipline or introducing measures 
to re-establish the unity of public debts. The first option has several 
drawbacks: maintaining interest rates spreads in Europe for an 
undefined time period, undermining the impact of fiscal policies 
and letting financial markets play an excessive role. The second 
option requires an issue to be settled first: according to which 
criteria and up to which level can a MS public debt be guaranteed 
by its partners? Several projects have not entirely made a choice 
between the two frameworks (see Gros and Mayer, 2010, Palley, 
2011, De Grauwe, 2012, Schulmeister, 2013). 
The simplest solution would consist in introducing a European 
debt agency (EDA), in charge of issuing a common debt for all euro 
area countries. This debt would be considered as safe by financial 
markets; it would be very liquid and could be issued at very low 
interest rates. But the EDA council would supervise domestic fiscal 
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policies and would be entitled to deny financing too lax countries, 
which would then have to issue bonds on markets. The EDA would 
strengthen the Stability Pact problems. What would be its assess-
ment criteria? What would be the democratic and economic 
legitimacy of its Council? How would the EDA decide that a 
country runs an excessive deficit, if the country considers that such 
a deficit is necessary to support activity (like in Germany and 
France in 2002-2005) or to rescue banks? Would it implement rigid 
rules (a country would be entitled to loans from the EDA up to 60% 
of its GDP) or softer ones? The EDA would benefit neither virtuous 
countries (which have no difficulty to get financing) nor countries 
in difficulty, which the EDA would refuse to finance and which 
would have to sue domestic bonds, without any European guar-
antee, without any potential financing from the ECB, in other 
words risky assets, bearing a high interest rate. These countries 
would be dependent on financial markets. The EDA makes sense 
only if it can finance all public debts, but then what should be 
done against lax countries? 
Delpla and von Weisäcker (2010) have suggested the introduc-
tion of a ‘blue debt, collectively issued and guaranteed, with a 
ceiling at 60% of GDP’. Each MS would also be allowed to issue a 
red debt under its own responsibility, and hence at a high interest 
rate. This would be a strong disincentive to issue public debt above 
60% of GDP. This proposal is almost similar to the EDA proposal 
and raises the same problems. The 60% level is arbitrary, and 
account neither for economic stabilisation needs, nor for the desire 
from financial institutions to own government debt. The 60% level 
is currently breached by 10 of the 12 original euro area MS (except 
Luxembourg and Finland). The gap between blue and red debts 
would allow financial markets to speculate in permanence. 
3.1. The single currency’s contradictions 
The system which worked until 1999 lied on unity between the 
government, the central bank and commercial banks. The central 
bank is the lender of last resort for the government and banks. The 
government can issue unlimited public debt. This debt is consid-
ered as safe and hence benefits from as low as possible market 
interest rates. Of course this unity was undermined by the central 
bank independence, which could have generated conflicts 
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between the government (caring about supporting output or 
specific spending) and the central bank (caring about maintaining 
low inflation). These conflicts could have led public finances to 
become unsustainable (see, for instance, Sterdyniak et al., 1994). 
But such situations did not occur before 2007. They did never 
question government solvency. 
The introduction of the euro area led to a particularly difficult 
situation. On the one hand, countries need to run more active fiscal 
policies because they have lost control over their interest rates and 
exchange rates. It can also be added that, since 1973, the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium has been requiring a certain level of public 
deficit and debt. Each country needs to run some equilibrium 
government deficits. The 2007 crisis strengthened this need. On the 
other hand, due to the single currency, current imbalances in one 
country affect the other countries of the area: excessive deficits (and 
surpluses) should be avoided. But how should they be defined? 
Last, the financial markets’ weight makes it necessary for public 
debts to become safe assets again, while at the same time Northern 
countries deny to give unlimited guarantee to their partners.
Therefore the procedures implemented since 2010 should be 
reviewed and their aims should be modified, which implies institu-
tional changes. Euro area countries should be able again to issue 
safe sovereign debt, at an interest rate controlled by the ECB. They 
should be able to run a public deficit in line with their macroeco-
nomic stabilisation needs. Public debt mutual guarantee must be 
entire for countries accepting to submit their economic policies to 
a coordination process. 
A coordination process needs to be organised between MS. 
Coordination should target GDP growth and full employment; it 
should account for all economic variables; countries should follow 
an economic policy strategy allowing to meet the inflation target 
(at least to remain within a target of around 2%), to meet an objec-
tive in terms of wage developments (in the medium-run real wages 
should grow in line with labour productivity), in the short-run 
adjustment processes should be implemented by countries where 
wages have risen too rapidly or too slowly; increases or cuts in 
social contributions may be used to facilitate the adjustment 
process; countries should announce and negotiate their current 
account balance targets; countries with high external surpluses 
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targets should agree to lower them or to finance industrial projects 
in Southern economies. The process should reach a unanimous 
agreement on a coordinated but differentiated strategy. Public defi-
cits resulting from this process should be financed through debt 
issuance guaranteed by all euro area countries and by the ECB. The 
Treaty needs to maintain an effective process in the event where 
no agreement is reached. In that case, the new debt issued by coun-
tries outside the agreement would not be guaranteed, but such a 
case should never occur. 
The EMS rules should be reviewed, the EMS should fully guar-
antee MS public debts, except in the case where MS depart from the 
commonly agreed policy. The EMS should have unlimited access to 
ECB refinancing.
In this context, the ECB could assign itself the objective of 
maintaining long-term interest rates at low levels, below euro area 
GDP growth. The euro area needs to recover the 10 percentage 
points of GDP lost because of the crisis. This would lead euro area 
MS public deficits and debts to be sustainable. Abandoning this 
objective means accepting mass unemployment in Europe. The EU 
institutions should elaborate a consistent exit crisis scenario, based 
on demand recovery, on households’ consumption and public 
spending, on investments for the future, within the environmental 
transition process, and on coordinated decreases in today’s 
imbalances.
Euro area’s survival requires that the European project becomes 
popular again, therefore is a source of growth, social progress and 
solidarity. It is only within this framework that institutional 
progresses could be made.
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